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The purpose of the European Community is to lay the foundations of an ever-closer
union among the peoples of Europe and to ensure economic and social progress in its
member countries by common action aimed at eliminating the barriers which divide
Europe. Over the years, the Community has progressively dismantled many obstructions
to trade including customs duties, quotas, and charges or measures which have an
equivalent effect. It has been recognized, however, that genuine economic integration re-
quires more extensive action in a number of fields.  In  accepting the Commission s pro-
posals for completing the internal market the European Council pledged the Community
in 1985 to a strategy which would lead to the realization of this objective.
If one considers the historical, cultural and economic diversity of the Member States, the
idea of creating a common market is clearly an ambitious undertaking. Enlargement has
provided the Community with further challenges. From a group of six countries witha relatively homogeneous economic structure, the Community now has 12 members
some 320 million inhabitants and an economy which shows marked regional disparities.
All the Communities' efforts are now being applied to strengthening the cohesion  of  this
unit and  to  removing the remaining obstacles which stand in the way of the Community
development.
Community businesses are also increasingly recognizing that a strengthening  of  the
European dimension is indispensable in order  to  maximize commercial opportunities.
There is a growing awareness that the creation of the single market can help to provide
stability to European industry by placing it on a more equal economic footing with its
major world competitors.
An efficient competition policy has a key role  to  play since it leads  to  the optimal alloca-
tion of resources and helps to create the best possible climate for fostering innovation and
technical progress in the unified market. The Cecchini Report recognizes that the ex-
pected  benefits  of  the single market, including increased productivity, lower prices and
greater employment opportunities, will not be realized unless free and fair competition
is fully maintained in the post-1992 Community.
The policy must ensure that new protectionist barriers are not erected, whether as a result
of restrictive business practices  or  through measures by Member States in favour of na-
tional enterprises.
'~~P'The existing Community rules for dealing with restrictive agreements, concerted prac-
tices and abuses of a dominant position are already making an important contribution
to the integration process, to the extent that they prevent market partitioning cartels
restrictive vertical agreements and abuses of monopoly power. These rules will continue
to have an essential function in creating and consolidating the single market. The Com-
mission is also seeking the adoption of a Community system of merger control, in order
to put in place the more complete legal framework which is necessary, if the benefits of
the integrated market are to be maximized.
In the context of 1992 the control of State aids also has considerable significance. Govern-
ment assistance to enterprises could be used as a protectionist tool, thus undermining the
wider strategy, which rests on the philosophy that the single market must be free and com-
petitive. The consistent application of the Community's State aid rules is therefore an
essential element in the creation and maintenance of a unified market.
As the pace towards the realization of the single market accelerates, the significance of
competition policy increases. This brochure has been prepared by the Commission in
recognition of this, and it sets out, for the benefit of companies and individuals who will
be operating in the single market, the essential provisions of the Community competition
rules, in so far as they affect undertakings.- What is the EEC?
Definition and aims of the EEG
The European Economic Community (BEC) was established in 1957 by France, Italy,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, for the
purpose of creating a union of European States, bound together by common economic
goals. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined and since 1981 Greece
has been a member. The entry of Spain and Portugal in 1986 brought the total member-
ship to 12.
By creating a single 'common market' the Member States strive together to achieve the
harmonious development of economic activities, continuous economic expansion and a
faster rise in the standard of living. With these goals in mind, the activities of the EEC
include:
(a) the elimination of customs duties between the Member States;
(b) the creation of a common commercial policy towards third countries;
(c) the creation of common policies in a number of specific sectors, such as agriculture
and transportation;
(d) the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital
throughout the Community;
(e) the creation of common funds to promote social and regional development;
(1) the approximation, or 'harmonization' as it is often referred to, of national laws;
(g) the establishment of a system which ensures that competition is not distorted.
Many of the most important barriers affecting trade between the Member States have
already been removed, and the Community s programme for the completion of the single
European market by 1992 is aimed at eliminating those which remain. Thus, undertak-
ings in the Community are increasingly able to reap the benefits of operating in a large
unified market of 320 million consumers.
Next to this general economic community which exists between the Member States a
common market has also been established in the coal and steel sector (BCSC, the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community) and in the field of nuclear energy (Euratom, the Euro-pean Atomic Energy Community). Together, the three Communities are commonly
referred to as the European Community (EC).
The institutions
The responsibility for achieving the aims of the European Community lies with four in"
stitutions:
(i) The European Parliament, which has 518 members, is elected directly by the citizens
of the Member States. The parliamentarians are not organized in national sections
but in Community-level political groups. The Parliament must be consulted on the
more important Commission proposals to the Council and has far-reaching powers
in the budgetary field, among others the power to reject the Community budget as
a whole. Also, the Parliament can compel the Commission to resign as a body by pass-
ing a motion of censure.
(ii) The Court of Justice, composed of 13 judges, assisted by six Advocates-General, en-
sures that implementation of the Treaties is in accordance with the rule of law. It plays
an essential role in the interpretation of European law, frequently at the request of
national courts. The Court also deals with disputes on Community matters between
Member States, between Member States and the Community institutions, or between
the latter and individuals, including firms.
. In the field of competition policy, the Court has issued important decisions which give
valuable guidance to undertakings as to the meaning of the competition rules.
(Hi) The Council consists of representatives of the governments of the 12 Member States.
Although the 'main' representative for each is its Foreign Minister, membership of the
Council varies with the subjects down for discussion. Meetings are thus often atten-
ded by the Ministers for Agriculture, Transport, etc.
Under the EEC and Euratom Treaties, any measure of general application or of a cer-
tain level of importance must be enacted by the Council, which can, however, only
in rare cases proceed without a proposal from the Commission.
(iv) The Commission is a collegiate body consisting of 17 Members, appointed by agree-
ment between the member governments. Throughout their four-year term of office
Members must remain independent of the governments and of the Council. The
Commission has a wide range of duties:
(a) it is the guardian of the 1featies;
(b) it is the executive arm of the Communities;
(c) it is the initiator of Community policy and exponent of the Community interest
in the Council.
Other Community organs include the Economic and Social Committee, the Euro"
pean Investment Bank and the Court of Auditors.Legislation in the  EEC
The EEC 1featy mentions four instruments which the competent Community institu-
tions can use to establish law or policy:
(i) regulations, which are laws directly applicable and binding in the Member States;
(ii) directives, which are addressed to Member States and which lay down the results to
be achieved, but leave the Member States free to choose form and methods;
(iii) decisions, which are binding on those to whom they are addressed, whether a Member
State, a legal entity or a private person. In the competition field, decisions issued by
the Commission can have a far-reaching impact on the behaviour of undertakings;
(iv) recommendations and opinions, which have no binding force.
This list of Community acts is not exhaustive: use is also made, for example, of com-
munications, memoranda, guidelines and general programmes.
In the competition area, the Commission has issued several notices which, although not
binding, can none the less be useful for undertakings as general guidance.Community law is a factor which all those operating in the common market must be
aware of and take into account. Not only do the EEC rules  including the rules of com-
petition  apply, often directly, in all the Member States but, in cases of conflict with
national laws, Community law prevails.II - The EEC competition rules whicJt apply to
undertakings
The creation of a single European market requires, among other things, the elimination
of economic barriers such as customs duties, quantitative restrictions, and other charges
and measures having an equivalent effect, which exist between the Member States. Ac-
cordingly, where national legislation impedes, for example, the free movement of goods
across MelIlber State frontiers, it is the national authorities who will COlIle under attack
for violating the Treaty.
Private arrangements, however, may .also interfere with cross-border trade by creating
divisions within the European market. For instance, companies may agree to keep out
of each others' national markets and in such cases , it is the companies themselves who
may face legal action under the competition rules.
The EEC Treaty provides for the establishment of a system to ensure that competition
in the common market is not distorted. The objective of market integration is as impor-
tant as the traditional role which competition plays in free market economies, ensuring
efficient allocation of resources, stimulating enterprises to make the best use of their
know-how and skills and encouraging them to develop new research techniques and
products.
The rules of competition are contained in Articles 85 to 94 of the EEC Treaty.
Articles 85 and 86 relate to anti-competitive behaviour by enterprises which has an effect
on trade between Member States. These are the rules which undertakings must be aware
of and must comply with in all their commercial dealings.
Both Articles are aimed at preserving and .enhancing competition rules by different
means. Article 85 is directed at agreements or concerted practices between two or more
enterprises, whereas Article 86 is aimed at abusive behaviour by monopolies or firms with
very considerable power.
Competition can, of course, also be distorted when national governments favour certain
undertakings, by granting them aids in whatever form, such as outright grants or special
tax advantages. This aspect of competition policy, which is dealt with in Articles 92 to
94 of the Treaty, is of indirect importance to enterprises in the sense that if the Commis-sion finds a certain State aid to be illegal, it will intervene against the national government
concerned and not against the company to whom the aid is given. However, in view of
the fact that companies might be obliged to reimburse any aids illegally received, it is ob-
viously also of direct relevance for them. A brief outline of the rules in this area is given
in Chapter V.
Note:  The ECSC ueaty imposes special competition rules on undertakings operating in
the coal or steel industry.
Article 
Basic principle  the prohibition of Article 85 (1)
Article 85 of the Treaty relates to anti-competitive behaviour by two or more undertak-
ings or decisions by their associations and it prohibits agreements or other practices
which distort competition and which are liable to affect trade between Member States.
Examples of such prohibited activities are price fixing between competitors, agreements
on market shares or production quotas, or tie-in clauses. The acquisition of shares in com-
peting companies, and other agreements leading to economic concentrations may also
fall within the scope of Article 85 (1). The prohibition of Article 85 applies both to so-
called horizontal agreements, meaning agreements between undertakings at the same
level of commercial activity (competitors), and to vertical agreements, such as agreements
between manufacturers and the distributors of their goods.
The following checklist can be used in considering whether a particular commercial ac"
tivity will be caught by the prohibition of Article 85 (1):
(i) there must be an agreement (in writing or oral), or a decision by an association of
undertakings (for example a trade association) or a so-called concerted practice, which
covers positive action falling short of an actual agreement, to align undertakings' ac-
tivities (hereinafter, the term 'agreement' will be used to cover all three types of ac-
tivities);
(ii) there must be more than one undertaking involved; the term 'undertaking' must be
viewed in the broadest sense, covering any entity engaged in economic or commercial
activities such as production, distribution or the supply of services and ranging from
small shops run by one individual to large industrial companies;
(iii) there must be a noticeable restraint upon competition involved; this applies not only
where the actual object but also where the effect is such a restraint;
(iv) the agreement must have a perceptible effect, actual or potential,. on trade between
Member States. Agreements which have no effect on trade at all, for example
agreements relating to warning labels on dangerous products, and agreements whichhave an impact only on internal trade within one Member State or on trade outside
the EC will not be caught. It should be emphasized that the fact that all parties to
an agreement are located in one Member State, and operate only on that market, does
not necessarily mean that there is no effect on inter-State trade. If the effects of the
agreement are not entirely confined to that Member State - for example, by having
an impact on exporters in other Member States  there  is  an effect on trade.
Activities outside the scope of Article 85 (1)
The administrative practice of the Commission provides for a procedure enabling parties
to an agreement to seek a declaration from the Commission that their activities do not
come within the scope of the competition rules and are therefore 'safe
Such 'negative clearances, as these declarations are called, can be given in individual
cases, provided the parties have notified their agreement to the Commission; this pro-
cedure is dealt with in Chapter Iv.
Furthermore, a number of 'block' negative clearances exist for certain activities which
because of either the size of the undertakings involved, the relationship between those
undertakings or the nature of the activity, are not deemed to be an infringement of the
competition rules. For certain of these activities, the Commission has issued notices to
provide guidance to business people as to what course of action they may pursue without
falling out of the competition rules.
When doubt remains as to whether an agreement falls within one of the following
categories, parties can of course apply for individual negative clearance.
Agreements of minor importance (the  de minimis  rule)
Small and medium-sized firms should be aware of the fact that many of the agreements
they conclude will not be considered as violating the competition rules because the
economic effect involved is not significant enough. This can be measured by market share
and turnover.
As a guideline, the Commission has issued a notice (Notice concerning agreements, deci-
sions and concerted practices of minor importance which do not fall under Article 85
(1) of the Treaty establishing the EEC) indicating that normally agreements will not be
caught by Article 85 (1) if two conditions are met:
(i) market share: the goods or services which are the subject of the agreement and other
goods or services of the participating undertakings, considered by consumers to besimilar by reason of their characteristics, price or use, must not represent more than
5 % of the total market in the area of the Community where the agreement has effect;
(ii) turnover: the aggregate annual turnover of the participating undertakings must not
exceed ECU 200 million.
Such so-called  de minimis  agreements are normally safe, even though they involve certain
restrictions. A caveat must be added: the criteria indicated by the Commission are by way
of guidance only.
Relations between underttlkings to which the competition rules do not apply
Commercial agents
In interpreting the EEC competition rules, the Commission stated in a notice issued in
1962 (Notice on exclusive dealing contracts with commercial agents) that a contract
made with a commercial agent transacting business on behalf of a principal did not fall
under Article 85 (1). A trader would only be considered to be a commercial agent
however, if he did not bear any responsibility for the financial risks involved in the
business transactions (except for the normal  del credere  guarantee, by which the agent
undertakes to indemnify the principal against failures to pay by customers) and was in
fact, no more than a mere intermediary of the principal. Where a distributor maintains
a considerable stock of the goods in question as his own property, where he provides at
his own expense substantial free customer services, or where he determines the prices at
which he sells or other terms of business, he will be deemed to be an independent trader
in which case, Article 85 must be taken into account.
Since 1962, legal developments have suggested a limiting of this approach. The Court
and the Commission have indicated that, in deciding whether a genuine agency relation-
ship exists, they would consider the economic reality as more important than the legal
form.
The decisive question is whether the agent is, or is not, economically integrated with the
principal. This is at least questionable where the agent is a very large firm and the prin-
cipal a small one, or where the agent is transacting business on behalf of several com-
peting principals.
Networks of agency contracts should be considered differently from individual contracts.
The Commission is currently preparing an updated notice in this area.Parent companies/subsidiaries
Article 85(1) can only apply where the competition which exists between undertakings
is capable of being restricted. Agreements between parent companies and their sub-
sidiaries, or between subsidiaries amongst themselves - in other words, undertakings
forming one economic unit  will not be caught by Article 85(1), where:
(i) the subsidiary does not have any real freedom to determine its course of action on the
market; one criterion here is how large the parent company s shareholding is;
(ii) the agreement relates merely to the allocation of tasks within the concern.
Activities which by their nature are not anti-competitive
The Commission has stated, again by way of notices, that certain forms of cooperation
between undertakings and certain types of subcontracting agreements do not pose any
problem under the competition rules. The size of the undertakings involved is generally
not relevant in this context.
Cooperation agreements
In its 'Notice concerning agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the field of
cooperation between enterprises: the Commission indicates that 18 types of agreement
are deemed not to restrict competition where their object is one of the following forms
of cooperation:
(a) an exchange of opinion or experience;
(b) joint comparative studies of enterprises or industries;
(c) joint preparation of statistics and calculation models;
(d) joint market research;
(e) cooperation in accounting matters;
(1) joint provision of credit guarantees;
(g) joint debt-collecting association;
(h) joint business or tax consultant agencies;
(i) joint implementation of research and development contracts;
OJ joint implementation of research and development projects;
(k) joint placing of research and development contracts;
(1) sharing out of research and development projects, among participating enterprises;
(m)joint use of production, storage and transport equipment;
(n) joint execution of orders (but only when the participants do not compete with each
other as regards the work to be done);(0) joint selling arrangements by non-competing firms;
(P) joint after-sales and repairs services when the participants are non-competing firms
, even if they are competitors, when these services are provided by an undertaking
independent of them;
(q) joint advertising (but no restriction is allowed on the participants also to advertise in-
dependently);
(r) joint quality marks (but only where the label is available to all competitors on the
same conditions).
Subcontracting
A subcontracting agreement is a form of work distribution whereby one firm - the sub-
contractor  supplies goods, work or services for another firm ~ the contractor - in
accordance with the latter s specifications. This distinguishes it from an ordinary sale of
goods or supply of services.
The provision of the contractor s technology or equipment to the subcontractor may
justify the obligation to supply solely to the contractor, the items manufactured or the
work done with the help of the technology or equipment. This is the case, not only when
the technology or equipment is protected by the contractor s industrial property rights
or rights over secret know-how, but also when it can be used to manufacture a distinctive
product or to supply a service which is not available from other undertakings in the sameindustry. Otherwise, the subcontractor must remain free to meet orders from other
customers.
Exemptions  Article 85 (3)
The general rule is that restrictive practices which affect inter-State trade are not allowed
and undertakings engaged in such activities will be ordered to stop doing so as well as
running the risk of being fined by the Commission. However, there is an important excep.
tion to this general rule. The prohibition of Article 85 can be declared inapplicable by
the Commission (and not by national courts) if the harmful effects of a restrictive agree-
ment or practice are sufficiently counterbalanced by a number of beneficial.elements.
Article 85 (3) lists four conditions which must all be met before such aso-called exemption
can be granted by the Commission:
(i) the agreement must contribute to an improvement in production or distribution, or
economic progress. In other words, there must be clear objective advantages involved
such as a reduction of costs or an increase of production capacity;
(ii) a fair share of the resulting benefits must be allowed to consumers (and this includes
not only ultimate consumers but also trade purchasers), for example, in the form of
lower prices or an improvement in the quality of the goods or services concerned;
(iii) only restrictions of competition which are indispensable in order to .achieve the
beneficial results will be allowed;
(iv)competition in respect of a substantial part of the goods or services in question.
Where an agreement meets these four requirements, an exemption can be granted, either
on an individual basis or by way of a group exemption.
(a) For the Commission to be able to grant an exemption in an individual case, the parties
must normally first have notified their agreement, to the Commission, on a special
form. Chapter IV deals with this procedure in greater detail. One important conse-
quence of notification should be noted. As a general rule, no fines may be imposed
for the period from the moment of notification until the Commission reaches a
decision;
(b) agreements need not be notified and will none the less benefit from exemption if they
fulfil the requirements contained in so-called group-exemption regulations which
exist with respect to certain categories of agreements. At present, group exemptions
are in force with respect to the following types of agreements:
specialization agreements
exclusive distribution agreements
exclusive purchasing agreements
patent licensing agreements
research and development agreements
distribution agreements in the automobile sectorfranchising agreements
. know-how licensing agreements.
These group exemptions are dealt with in more detail in Chapter ill.
Consequences  Article 85 (2)
If an agreement falls within the prohibition of Article 85(1), the following consequences
apply.
(i) It is null and void from the outset. An agreement can be declared void, and thus unen-
forceable, by a national court, if the parties are involved in a lawsuit about the agree-
ment. The Commission can also order parties to put an end to such a prohibited
agreement.
(ii) The Commission has the power to order the parties to terminate the illegal conduct
and it may impose fines of up to BCD 1 million, I or a larger sum up to 10% of the
annual turnover of the undertakings concerned. Fines are paid to the Commission,
not to any parties injured by the anti-competitive behaviour. The latter, however, may
seek damages in national courts.
Article 
Article 85 relates to restrictive practices between undertakings. As long as there is an ap"
preciable restraint upon competition and an effect on inter-State trade, such agreements
are prohibited, regardless of the size of the undertakings concerned.
I The ecu (European currency unit) was equal, on 30 June 1988, to BFRlLFR 43.48 (convertible) or 47.
(financial), DKR 7. , DM 2. , DR 166. , FF 7. , HFL 2. , IRL 0. , LIT 1 539. , UKL 0.67.Article 86 is directed at a different problem, namely the behaviour of undertakings which
are in a dominant position. Having a dominant position is not in itself prohibited.
The elements necessary for application of Article 86 are:
(a) The undertaking must be in a dominant position. Although market share is the major
element in assessing dominance (as a rule a share below 40% precludes a finding that
the undertaking is dominant), it is by no means the only factor. An undertaking can
be deemed to be dominant if, because of various factors, such as ready access to raw
materials or capital, it has the power to act independently, without having seriously
to take into account its competitors, purchasers or suppliers.
(b) The dominant position must be in the common market or a substantial part of it.
Whether a particular geographical area  for example a portion of a Member State
- can be deemed to be a 'substantial part' depends on a number of factors, including
the nature of the product market involved. In one case, the southern part of Germany
was held to be 'substantial' in this context; in another case , Belgium.
(c) There must be an abuse of the dominant position, in the sense that advantage is taken
of the dominant position which causes injury to third parties. Examples are:
(i) charging unfair purchase or selling prices. Prices which are unfairly high will be
to the detriment of consumers, while those which are unfairly low (below cost)
may be aimed at eliminating weaker competitors, who do not have the power to
match such prices for any length of time;
(ii) discriminatory prices, e.g. charging customer A more than customer B for exactly
the same transaction, thereby placing customer A at a competitive disadvantage;
(iii) refusal to sell to a customer without valid, objective reasons;
. (iv) attempts to hold on to customers, for example by granting fidelity rebates;
(v) acquisitions of competing undertakings, thereby affecting the competitive struc-
ture within the common market.
It should be noted that economic concentrations brought about by merger or acquisition
may fall within the scope of Article 86 where the acquiring company already occupies
a dominant position in the relevant market.Merger trends in the Community, 1984-
The following chart highlights the recent growth in the number of mergers and acquisi-
tions of majority holdings within the Community (including international operations
between Community and non-Community enterprisesp
Total mergers and acquisitions of Mergers and acquisitions of majori-
majority holdings involving at least ty holdings where the combined
one of the I 000 largest firms in the tUrnover of the firms involved ex-
Community ceeded ECD I 000 million
Sector 2 1985- 1986- 1987- 1985- 1986- 1987-
1. Food
2. Chem.
3. Elec.
4. Mech.
5. Compo
6. Meta.
7. Trans.
8. Pap. 
9. Extra.
10. Text.
11. Cons.
12. Other
Total 227 303 383 108 17l 268
Source:  Data gathered by the Commission in the specialist press.
Key
Food: Food and drink
Chern.: Chemicals, fibres, glass, ceramic wares, rubber
EIec.: Electrical and electronic engineering, office machinery
Mech.: Mechanical and instrument engineering, machine tools
Comp.: Computers and data-processing equipment (in 1983/84, included under mechanical engineering)
Meta.: Production and preliminary processing of metals, metallic goods
Trans.: Vehicles and transport equipment
Pap.: Wood, furniture and paper
Extra.: Extractive industries
Text.: Textiles, clothing, leather and footwear
Cons.: Construction
Other: Other manufacturing industryIII - How the competition rules affect agreements
and other business dealings of undertakings
Introduction
In the previous chapter, a general description was given of the meaning of Article 85(1)
of the EEC Treaty with regard to restrictive agreements, concerted practices or decisions
of associations of undertakings.
Having thus established the principles involved in the application of this Article, we now
turn to its relevance with regard to specific types of agreements.
Article 85 itself lists, by way of example, several types of agreements which may prevent
restrict or distort competition.
For the sake of clarity, we will make a distinction between  horizontal agreements
(agreements between competitors or potential competitors) and  vertical agreements
(agreements between undertakings in different stages of the process through which a pro-
duct or service passes from the manufacturer to the final consumer).
The  de minimis  rule
As indicated in Chapter II, agreements which, because of the marketshare and the turn-
over of the undertakings involved are deemed to have a negligible effect on competition
and inter-State trade pose no problems under the competition rules.
This so-called  de minimis  rule applies to agreements between companies which meet the
criteria as to market share and turnover, laid down in the Notice concerning agreements
of minor importance. Whatever the nature of the agreement in question, if the two
criteria are applicable, the undertakings concerned normally need not worry about the
possible applicability of Article 85(1) and can therefore refrain from notifying the Com-
mission.
In borderline cases, of course, undertakings are well-advised to consider whether their
agreement falls under any of the headings indicated below.Horizontal agreements
Horizontal agreements which pose no problems under the competition rules
When undertakings have established that a particular agreement does not satisfy the 
minimis  rule, the next step is t.o check whether the agreement is one which by its nature
is not deemed to pose a pr.oblem under Article 85(1).
For this purp.ose, the Notices on, respectively, c.ooperation agreements and subcontract-
ing agreements offer guidance. These are dealt with in Chapter II.
Horizontal agreements which benefit .from a group exemption
Specialization (Commission Regulation  417/85)
Specialization agreements are one .of the forms of horizontal agreement now exempted
as a group under Article 85(3), This means that although Article 85(1) is normally ap-
plicable (again, the  de minimis  rule must first be considered), agreements which fall under
the criteria of the gr.oup exemption issued by the Commission are deemed to meet the
requirements of exemption under Article 85(3) with.out the need of prior notificati.on.
For the purpose of the group exemption, specialization agreements are agreements by
which parties undertake a reciprocal .obligation:
(i) not to manufacture certain products .or to have them manufactured, but to leave it
to other parties to manufacture the products or have them manufactured; or
(ii) to manufacture certain products .or t.o have them only manufactured jointly.
By giving up the manufacture of certain products, the participating undertakings can
each concentrate - or, in other words
, '
specialize in the manufacture .of those pro-
ducts remaining in their respective production lines. Competition is restricted because the
parties give up the possibility .of independently manufacturing certain items.
The group exemption was created in order to allow small and medium.sized firms to im-
prove their producti.on processes and thereby strengthen their competitive position  vis-
a-vis  larger firms.
In .order to fall under the group exemption, specialization agreements must fulfil the
following conditi.ons.
(1) The agreement must be between small and medium-sized undertakings, measured on
the basis of market share and turnover, in this case:
(a) the market share with respect to the specialized products may not exceed in a
substantial part of the common market, 20% of the market for all such products;(b) the total annual turnover of the participating undertakings must not exceed BCD
500 million. If the turnover exceeds this limit, the parties can still benefit from the
group exemption but they must notify their agreement to the Commission.
The group exemption is basically aimed at individual small and medium-sized firms:
if a small firm is in fact part of a larger concern, the market share and turnover of
the whole concern must be taken into account, with the result that the thresholds
would probably be exceeded and the exemption thus inapplicable,
(2) The commitment to specialize must be reciprocal, which means that an obligation
on only one of the parties to refrain from production of a certain item would not
qualify for group exemption.
(3) The commitment must refer only to the nature of the products, so that any quan-
titative limitation of production does not fall within the group exemption.
(4) Certain additional clauses may be agreed which are essential to implement the com-
mitment to specialize:
(a) a non-competition clause;
(b) exclusive purchasing and distribution commitments with respect to the special.
ized products, in order to enable the participants to continue dealing in the whole
range of products;
(c) obligations concerning minimum stocks, replacement parts, and customers and
after-sales services.
(5) Commitments with regard to prices are not allowed in the context of the group  ex-
emption.
Research and development (Commission Regulation No  418/85)
The Commission has always shown a favourable attitude towards R&D cooperation, pro-
vided that competition is maintained by the existence of different independent poles of
research.
The block exemption regulation on R&D agreements covers three types of agreements
concerning:
(i) joint research and development of products or processes with joint exploitation of the
results of that R&D;
(ii) joint research and development of products or processes without joint exploitation
of the results (if, exceptionally, such 'pure' R&D agreements fall within Article 85(1));
(Hi) joint exploitation of the results of prior R&D agreements between the same under-
takings.
The notion of 'joint exploitation' includes joint manufacturing and joint licensing to third
parties, but  not  joint distribution and selling.Under the regulation, joint R&D must be carried out in the framework of a defined pro-
gramme and joint exploitation is only allowed where the know-how resulting from the
common R&D contributes substantially to technical or economic progress and con-
stitutes a decisive element for the manufacturing of the new or improved products. Fur-
thermore, the block exemption is only applicable:
(i) if all the parties have access to the results;
(ii) if, where there is no joint exploitation, each party is free to exploit independently the
results and any pre-existing technical knowledge necessary therefor;
(iii) if, in the case of specialization in the manufacturing of the new or improved products
each party has the right to distribute those products.
In order to ensure the possibility of several independent poles of research in the Com-
munity and, in general, to maintain effective competition on the markets concerned, the
block exemption sets out different conditions according to the competitive position of the
parties:
(i) where at the time the agreement is entered into, any of the parties are competitors
for products which may be improved or replaced by the results of R&D, the exemption
applies only if their combined production of such products does not exceed 20% of
the market;
(ii) where no two or more of the parties are competitors at the time the agreement is
entered into, the exemption applies irrespective of market shares;
(iii) after five years of joInt exploitation, the exemption continues to apply, whether the
parties were initially competitors or not only  if their combined production for the new
product does not exceed 20% of the market.
The regulation contains a detailed list of permitted restrictions and obligations, such as
those aimed at reinforcing the cooperation between the parties in the field of R&D, and
provisions relating to the field of use of the new technology or granting limited territorial
protection to the parties. Also listed in detail are the provisions which may under no cir-
cumstances be included in agreements if the parties want to benefit from the block ex-
emption (the 'black list'). An opposition procedure is included whereby agreements con.
taining restrictions not expressly exempted or prohibited by the regulation can be notified
to the Commission and will be deemed to be covered by the block exemption unless the
Commission opposes exemption within six months.
Horizontal agreements which are not aUowed
Assuming the  de minimis  rule, the Notices on cooperation and subcontracting and the
specialization and R&D block exemptions are all not applicable in a particular case, (com-
peting) undertakings must refrain from engaging in the following activities:
(a) Price fixing (other trading conditions). Prohibited are all agreements, directly or in-
directly fixing buying andbr selling prices. The term 'mdirectly' covers the situationwhere undertakings agree in general as to their pricing policies. Also prohibited are
any agreements by which undertakings restrict themselves as to the trading condi-
tions they apply in their business dealings, such as on what basis discounts are
granted, credit terms, etc.
(b) Market or production sharing. Agreements between (potential) competitors to keep
out of each others' markets or to allocate certain territories or sources of supply
amongst themselves are prohibited. Arrangements to control production itself, such
as limitations imposed by quotas, as well as long-term plans regarding production are
normally not allowed.
(c) Agreements to discriminate. Agreements between undertakings to fix discriminatory
terms in their dealings with third parties who are in competition with each other are
not allowed. For example when A and B agree to apply more advantageous conditions
to buyer C than to buyer D, for transactions which are the same, buyer D will be
placed at a competitive disadvantage. It should be noted that this type of behaviour
is only prohibited where there is an agreement between A and B to discriminate. In
the absence of a dominant position, A, acting individually, is as a general rule free
to apply the terms he wants in his various business dealings.
(d) Collective boycotts. Agreements between undertakings aimed at forcing a (potential)
competitor out of the market or preventing market entry by others are not allowed.
(e) Tie-ins. Agreements are not allowed by which undertakings impose ' tying ar-
rangements, for example, obliging a buyer of one product or service also to buy
another product or service which is not connected to the first by nature ofits commer-
cial usage.
This list of prohibited agreements is not exhaustive, but illustrates the types of agreement
which have restrictive effects on competition.
Horizontal agreements which may pose problems
Again, assuming the  de minimis  rule does not apply, certain agreements may possibly
violate Article 85(1):
(i) Joint purchasing agreements between competitors and even between non-competing
firms may lead to a restriction on competition, for example, by making it more dif-
ficult for suppliers to make individual sales to the participants in the joint purchasing
arrangements. Joint purchasing agreements between small firms can be encouraged
so as to place them in a better competitive position  vis-a-vis  powerful purchasing con.
cerns. However, the purchasing power which is created when firms participate in joint
purchasing cannot be allowed to assume such proportions as would lead to an abuse
of that purchasing power  vis-a-vis  suppliers.
(ii) Joint selling agreements which limit the freedom of the parties to fix their selling
prices or otherwise to sell as they see fit will normally infringe Article 85(1). Such sell-ing arrangements can for example be organized in the  context  of a trade association
or through jointly owned marketing subsidiaries.
Joint selling arrangements between non.competing firms (actual or potential) will
normally not be held to violate Article 85(1), nor is it likely that joint selling to coun-
tries outside the EEC will be deemed to be an infringement provided trade between
Member States is not affected.
(iii) Sales promotion. Three types of sales promotion may be relevant under the competi-
tion rules: trade fairs, joint advertising and the use of a common quality-control label.
'D:ade associations which organize trade fairs may impose certain restrictions on
the members as to their participation in trade fairs other than those organized by
the association. These restrictions may be anti-competitive at two levels, in that
they limit the possibilities of other organizers of trade fairs to acquire participants
and furthermore limit the freedom of participating producers to promote their
goods elsewhere. Certain restrictions may, however, be exemptable because of the
advantages which result from an orderly organization of trade fairs.
Joint advertising may be used to promote the products of a particular industry or
a common brand. Such joint publicity normally poses no problems, as long as the
participants remain free also to promote their products independently.
. The use of a common quality-control label or trademark in joint promotional ac-
tivities is allowed when use of the label is open to all manufacturers whose pro-
ducts meet the relevant quality standards. If further restrictions are involved, such
as an obligation on the participants not to manufacture other products not covered
by the common label, the agreement may pose problems under Article 85(1).(iv) Exchange of information. Undertakings may arrange to exchange information, for
example, through a central agency, on quantities, prices, discounts and other terms
of business, or on suppliers and customers. Such exchange of information can lead
to an alignment of the participants' business conduct.
The legality of such information arrangements will depend on, in the first place, the
type of information involved. Exchange of purely statistical information, for example
on production and sales figures for a particular industry, without identifying the in-
dividual firms concerned, is not objectionable.
In general, information arrangements become dangerous from the competition point
of view where they are likely to lead to collusion: Cooperation which jeopardizes the
independent determination of business policies by the participants must be avoided.
(v) Trade associations/market foreclosure. Undertakings in a particular sector may validly
pursue common interests by creating a trade association. Among the possible pro-
blems which must be considered in this context are:
activities within the trade association which tend to deprive members of their
freedom to determine their individual business policies;
market foreclosure  vis-a-vis  potential competitors who want to enter a particular
market, where all or nearly all of the undertakings in that sector are organized in
such an association.
Both of these may give rise to problems under the competition rules.
(vi) Non-competition clauses in connection with the sale of an undertaking. When the
ownership of an undertaking changes hands, the new owner (the purchaser) will nor-
mally want to be protected from competition by the previous owner (the seller), who
may at least initially be in a stronger competitive position due to his knowledge of
the market, etc.
Agreements relating to the sale of undertakings therefore often contain so-called non-
competition clauses, obliging the seller to refrain from competing in the market in
question.
Whether such a clause is a forbidden restriction of competition depends on a number
of factors:
if the sale involves merely the transfer of material assets, a non-competition clause
is normally not necessary and therefore in violation of Article 85(1);
if the sale involves the transfer of good-will and know-how, protection from com-
petition by the seller will normally be acceptable under Article 85(1), under two
conditions:
(1) the duration of the clause must not exceed the period required for an active
competitive purchaser to build up his position to equal that of the previous
owners at the time of the transfer; the length of this period depends on the
specific facts of each case;(2) the scope of the clause may not be excessively wide; the obligation not to com-
pete must be limited to the market in which the undertaking was active before
its sale.
Vertical agreements
General
The horizontal agreements dealt with in the previous chapter involve situations in which
competition is diminished due to arrangements by competitors restricting their indepen-
dent business behaviour.
Vertical agreements relate to the passage of a product from the factory to the end-user.
In the EC, such agreements are particularly relevant to the creation of one European
market, in that distribution arrangements across Member State borders can promote
market unification.
In this chapter, the problem of distribution will be dealt with in the context of Article
85(1); in other words only situations in which agreements have been concluded relating
to distribution will be considered. For the application of Article 86 (abuse of a dominant
position) no distinction need be made between horizontal and vertical activities; the same
concepts apply regardless of whether a dominant firm abuses its position  vis-a-vis  its com-
petitors (horizontal) or in the distribution of its products (vertical).
Whether or not vertical agreements come under Article 85(1) depends on the extent to
which the parties, i.e. the supplier and his intermediary/distributor, agree to restrict their
commercial freedom. The following concepts are relevant with respect to distribution
agreements:
(i) 'simple' distribution agreements: where neither the supplier nor the distributor is
bound to any restrictive obligations, such as exclusivity of purchase andbr supply, ter"
ritorial restrictions, non-competition clauses, or minimum purchase requirements
the agreement will not fall within the scope of Article 85(1);
(ii) exclusive distribution agreements: the supplier agrees to supply only one distributor
in a determined territory. Here, Article 85(1) is relevant: there is a restriction on com-
petition in that the supplier is no longer free to supply other distributors or, in some
cases, even end users directly, in that territory. In return for the .exclusivity, the ex-
clusive distributor may in turn accept certain restrictions, for example, he may also
agree not to act as the distributor for the supplier s competitors;
(iii) exclusive purchasing agreements: the distributor agrees to purchase all of his re"
quirements of a particular product only from one supplier. The distributor is thusrestricted in his source of supply and other suppliers of the same type of goods have
lost a sales outlet;
(iv) selective distribution: a supplier may wish to limit the sale of his products to only those
sales outlets that meet certain standards. For example, in the case of highly technical
products, the supplier may require that all dealers possess a minimum degree of
technical knowledge.
In the following sections, the applicability of Article 85(1) and the possibilities of exemp-
tion are considered.
Distribution agreements which pose no problems under Article 85(1)
For application of Article 85(1), there must be an agreement between independent under-
takings. Thus, the following cases do not fall under the prohibition:
(a) distribution by the manufacturer himself;
(b) distribution through a branch office in a given territory; although a position of ex-
c1usivity  is present, the branch is seen as part of the manufacturer himself;
(c) likewise, true agency agreements, where the commercial agent is merely an auxiliary
of the supplier, do not fall under Article 85(1)  see Chapter II; and
(d) where alocal subsidiary company is entrusted with the distribution of the supplier
goods, Article 85(1) will not apply ifthat subsidiary has no autonomous commercial
freedom (see Chapter II).
The  de minimis  rule (see Chapter II) also applies to vertical arrangements.
However, a caveat must be added: The underlying principle of the  de minimis  rule is, that
for Article 85(1) to apply, the restriction on inter-State trade and of competition must be
appreciable. If a supplier concludes only one distribution agreement with a particular
distributor, there will normally be no problem if the criteria as to market share .and turn-
over are fulfilled. However, if that supplier has set up a vast network of agreements with
a large number of distributors, the whole effect of that network may be relevant, and not
just the individual agreements between the supplier and each distributor.
Exclusive distribution agreements (Commission Regulation No 1983/83)
General
Although exclusive distribution agreements as described above have detrimental effects
as far as competition is concerned, such agreements may at the same time be beneficial
not only in improving the efficiency of distribution but, in general, by contributing tomarket unification. For example, contacts with one (exclusive) distributor only in a par-
ticular area may make it easier for a supplier entering a new market to deal with linguistic
and legal differences.
The underlying principle of the group exemption is that while certain restrictions will be
allowed in the interest of improving distribution, those restrictions may not go too far
and must notably never result in absolute market insulation. In this context, the concept
of parallel imports is very important. 'Parallel imports' exist where in addition to the 'of-
ficial' route by which the goods are imported by the exclusive distributor into a given ter-
ritory, there is also a second 'parallel' route, by which another trader in the territory im-
ports the goods, which he has obtained from a third party outside the territory. In other
words, that 'parallel importer' is a source of competition for the exclusive distributor. Any
attempts to hinder such parallel imports render the group exemption inapplicable.
Specific provisions
The exemption may apply where (i) A (the supplier) agrees with B (the reseller or
distributor, to supply only to B certain goods for resale within a defined area in the com-
mon market, or (ii) B .(the reseller) agrees with A (the supplier) to purchase only from A
certain goods for resale or (iii) A agrees to supply exclusively to B and at the same time
B agrees to purchase exclusively from A.
The main conditions of the group exemption are:
(1) the agreement must involve two parties only. These need not necessarily be estab-
lished within the common market;
(2) the products must be supplied for resale. Thus for example the exemption does not
apply when the distributor uses the products to manufacture another end-product;
(3) the sales area must be either a defined part of the common market, or the entire ter-
ritory of the common market;
(4) the only permitted restriction on the supplier is the obligation not to sell to other
resellers in the sales area allocated to the exclusive distributor;
(5) the supplier may not be required to guarantee absolute territorial protection for the
distributor, for example, by barring parallel imports into the sales area;
(6) the supplier may, however, agree not to make direct sales himself to customers within
the distributor s territory;
(7) the distributor may agree to purchase all his requirements from the supplier. Aside
from this, the following obligations on the distributor are also permitted under the
group exemption:
(a) not to manufacture or sell.competing goods;
(b) to concentrate his sales efforts in his sales territory; this means that he can be
obliged to refrain from actively seeking customers elsewhere. He must, howeveralways remain free to sell outside his sales territory, even in areas allocated by the
same supplier to other exclusive distributors;
(c) to purchase minimum quantities;
(d) to sell under the trademark, etc. indicated by the supplier;
(e) to carry out after-sales service.
No restrictions may be imposed on the distributor as to his prices and other terms of
resale, such as the choice of his customers. Where these exist, the benefit of the group
exemption is lost;
(8) the agreement must not involve competing manufacturers, since this could lead to
(horizontal) market sharing. However, where one or both of the parties have a total
annual turnover of less than ECU 100 million, non-reciprocal distribution
agreements are allowed between competing manufacturers;
(9) there must be no effort by the parties to create absolute territorial protection for the
distributor, including the improper use of a patent or trademark for that purpose. In
other words, parallel imports of the contract goods must remain possible.
Agreements which satisfy these conditions are automatically exempted, without the
need for the parties to notify the agreement to the Commission. The Commission does
however, retain the right to withdraw the benefit of the group exemption in certain cases
for example if the distributor is abusing the exemption by charging unreasonably high
prIces.
Agreements which contain restrictions going beyond the conditions of the group exemp-
tion can, of course, be notified to the Commission in order to obtain an individual ex-
emption.
Exclusive purchasing agreements (Commission Regulation No 1984/83)
Agreements by which a reseller is obliged to buy his supplies exclusively from a stated
manufacturer or other supplier (e.g. wholesaler), without, however, being allotted an ex-
clusive sales territory, present different problems than exclusive distribution agreements.
Where a supplier has succeeded in tying the most numerous or the largest sales outlets
in a given area to himself, his competitors may find it very difficult to sell their goods
in that area. The longer the duration of the exclusive purchasing obligation and the wider
the range of products involved, the more serious is this barrier to market entry for com-
petitors.
Also, such arrangements limit the commercial freedom of the resellers, who may often
be smaller firms.
With these considerations in mind, the group exemption on exclusive purchasing, which
parties must take into account for all exclusive purchasing agreements entering into force
after 1 January 1984, provides that:(i) the maximum duration of the exclusive purchasing obligation must be limited to five
years (renewable);
(ii) the range of products covered by the obligation must be limited to products which
either by their nature or by commercial usage are connected to each other.
Aside from these provisions as to the duration and the range of the obligation, the same
provisions found in the group exemptions (both old and new) for exclusive distribution
agreements apply.
Beer and petrol
Special provisions are included in the new group exemptions for exclusive purchasing
agreements relating to beer (and other drinks) sold for consumption on the spot (in cafes
for example) and to petrol sold in service stations
Normally, such agreements entail considerable financial involvement on the part of sup-
pliers, which may thus justify binding the reseller for a longer period of time than in other
sectors.
The following special provisions were therefore deemed appropriate for such beer supply
or service-station agreements:
(1) the maximum duration of an exclusive tie for beer alone or for petrol is 10 years;
(2) in beer-supply agreements, if the obligation relates to beer  and  other drinks, the max-
imum duration is five years;
(3) for both beer-supply and .service-station agreements, if the premises where the pro~
ducts are sold are subject to a tenancy agreement between the reseller and the supplier,
the duration of the exclusive purchasing obligation can be as long as the duration of
the tenancy (even if it is longer than 10 years);
(4) as to the range of products covered, for beer supply agreements, no other products
maybe included in the tie except other drinks (i.e. not crisps, fruit machines, etc.). For
service-station agreements, the tie can relate only to petroleum-based motor vehicle
fuels and, in some cases to lubricants to be used in a lubrication bay (i.e. not maps
car-accessories, etc.
(5) special transitional rules apply to such agreements.
Those interested in detailed information on the rules governing beer supply and service-
station agreements are advised to consult the relevant 'Guidelines' published in the 
ficial Journal of the European Communities.Selective  distribution
Certain manufacturers may want their products to be sold only by qualified
, '
approved'
dealers. This is particularly true for technically sophisticated products such as electronic
equipment, watches or automobiles.
In such cases, so-called selective distribution systems can be created in which only
selected' dealers are authorized to distribute the goods concerned.
The selection of the dealers allowed into the system sometimes takes place on the basis
of purely qualitative criteria which are entirely justified, given the nature of tqe product
in question. For example, dealers may need a minimum amount of technical knowledge
or skilled personnel, or suitable premises in order to be able to sell the products in an ap-
propriate way. If all dealers who fulfil these justified quality standards are allowed
without discrimination into the system, there will be no objections as far as the EEC com-
petition rules are concerned.
It also happens, however, that manufacturers go beyond applying purely qualitative
criteria when appointing dealers. They may, for example, accept only dealers who are will-
ing to carry out sales promotion for the manufacturer s products, or to stock his other
products.
Dealers who are technicaJly qualified to sell the products concerned but who are unwill-
ing to accept these additional obligations, are thus excluded from the system; this is
clearly a restriction.
Even more restrictive is a selection system in which the manufacturer applies quantitative
criteria, for example, limiting the number of dealers in an area to the presumed purchas-
ing power of the population there. In these cases, dealers who are qualified and moreover
willing to accept additional obligations may nevertheless be excluded.
Aside from the need to have qualified dealers for certain products, all the above restric-
tions may seriously harm competition. Such closed distribution systems may be par-
ticularly damaging for potential dealers who may be excluded without any objective
reasons. Also, the dealers who are a part of such a network may be seriously hampered
in their commercial freedom, for example they may be obliged to sell only to other ap"
proved dealers.
These distribution systems can in any event not benefit from the group exemption for
exclusive distribution agreements (see above), because the restrictions go beyond those
allowed.
They may however be exempted on an individual basis if they manifestly improve
distribution and fulfil all the other conditions for exemption under Article 85(3). It mustin these circumstances be clear that the beneficial results cannot be achieved through
other, less restrictive means.
Any indication that a selective distribution system is being used artificially to maintain
prices, or to exclude in a discriminatory way certain types of retail outlets (for example
discount shops or supermarkets who are qualified to sell the products), or any attempts
to hinder parallel imports through the system, will make exemption highly unlikely, and
such distribution systems thus remain illegal. Action can then be called for by national
courts or by the Commission.
Automobiles
Selective distribution systems are more common in certain sectors than in others, often
depending on the nature of the products concerned.
One example is the motor vehicle sector, where manufacturers tend to set up distribution
networks in which, at all stages, access is reserved only for selected dealers.
In view of the special circumstances in the motor trade, a number of restrictions of com-
petition that appear in dealership and servicing agreements fulfil the conditions for ex-
emption laid down by Article 85(3) of the Treaty. Distribution arrangements of a selective
and exclusive nature are usually indispensable measures of rationalization in this sector.
Also, motor vehicles are consumer durables that at both regular and irregular intervals
require expert maintenance and repair, not always in the same place. The cooperation bet-
ween the manufacturer or his importer and a number of selected dealers and repairers
guarantees the provision of specialized servicing for the product. Finally, competition in
the motor trade tends to focus on inter-brand competition between rival distribution net-
works. A certain degree of restriction of intra-brand competition between dealers and
repairers in the same network and for the same goods can thus be tolerated.
A block exemption regulation (Commission Regulation No 123/85) exempts, in principle
the following types of restrictions on the motor dealer:
(i) not to sell the new vehicles of another manufacturer nor parts which do not match
the quality of those supplied by the manufacturer to whom he is linked;
(ii) not actively to seek customers outside his allotted territory;
(iii) not to subcontract distribution or servicing and repairs to other dealers or repairers
without the consent of the manufacturer or his importer;
(iv) not to sell new vehicles or replacement parts obtained from the manufacturer 
dealers outside the distribution network.
Also exempted is a restriction on the manufacturer s freedom to appoint other dealers or
to supply end-users direct in the allotted territory.Certain conditions are attached to the exemption in order to safeguard effective competi-
tion and unrestricted freedom for consumers to buy new cars in the common market
wherever prices and conditions are most favourable. The regulation, in particular, ensures
that:
(a) consumers can have servicing or repairs done under the manufacturers warranty
anywhere in the common market;
(b) dealers are not made over-dependent on the manufacturer or importer; thus, the
agreements must run for at least four years and specify at least one year s notice for
termination;
(c) consumers can order new passenger cars with the specifications required at the place
where they are to be registered from official dealers in other Member States who are
willing to sell the vehicles to them, if the manufacturer or his importer sells the model
concerned through the official distribution network at both places. This condition
stops manufacturers or importers from trying to prevent or hinder sales of right"
hand-drive versions of their cars on the Continent.
The Commission has always stressed that it has neither the desire nor the power to take
interventionist measures to harmonize car prices across the common market. It cannot
satisfy demands to abolish price differentials between Member States which are in fact
partly a reflection of the particular play of supply and demand in the regions concerned.
However, where price differentials are substantial, there may be reason to suspect that
national measures or private restrictive measures are behind them and very large, long-
lasting price-differentials between Member States can thus result in withdrawal of the
benefit of the block exemption in individual cases.
Franchising
Franchising agreements have developed considerably in the Community during recent
years as a new form of distribution. They consist essentially of licences of industrial or
intellectual property rights (trademarks or names or know-how) to be exploited for the
purpose of selling goods or providing services to end-users in premises of uniform ap-
pearance and with the same business methods.
Franchise agreements have generally a positive effect on competition. They improve
distribution as they give franchisors the possibility of establishing a uniform distribution
network without the need for major investments, which may assist the entry of new com-
petitors on the market, particularly in the case of small and medium-sized undertakings
thus increasing inter-brand competition. They also allow independent traders to set up
outlets more rapidly and with a higher chance of success than if they had to do so without
the franchisor s experience and assistance. They therefore have the possibility of com-
peting efficiently with large distribution undertakings. Finally, they allow consumers and
other end-users a fair share of the resulting benefit, as they combine the advantage ofa uniform distribution network with the existence of traders personally interested in the
efficient operation of their business.
With these considerations in mind, the Commission enacted, in 1988, a block exemption
regulation in the field of franchising agreements (Commission Regulation No 4087/88
OIL  359 1988). The Regulation is based on the principle that the exemption should app-
ly to all economic sectors, including those where specific block exemptions have been
adopted (motor vehicles, beer, service-stations). This is because franchise agreements are
considered to be different in nature from selective distribution or exclusive purchasing
agreements. The Regulation however formally excludes the possibility of combining dif-
ferent block exemptions. The block exemption covers distribution and service franchises
but does not include manufacturing franchises, which consist normally of patent, know-
how andbr trademark licences.
Main provisions of the Regulation
The Regulation exempts the territorial protection granted by the franchisor to the fran-
chisee or to the master franchisee, the location clause imposed on the franchisee and the
obligation on the latter not to deal in goods competing with those manufactured by the
franchisor or bearing its trademark.
A list is included of the obligations which are normally not to be restrictive of competi-
tion. Exclusive purchase is admitted only for products for which it is not possible to for"
mulate objective quality specifications. A non-competition obligation is also considered
as non-restrictive, including for a period up to one year after termination of the contract.
To take account of the possibility that some of the obligations listed such as the non-com-
petition clause or the obligation to keep minimal stocks, might in practice be restrictive
of competition, the Regulation states that in such a case they are also covered by the ex-
emption. This technique mirrors that which has been adopted in the patent licensing and
motor-vehicle distribution regulations.
The exemption applies only where certain conditions are fulfilled such as the possibility
of inter-franchisee sales and Community-wide guarantee.
The Regulation contains a 'black list' of restrictions which prevent the application of the
exemption. This applies in particular to market sharing between competing manufac-
turers, clauses unduly restricting the franchisees choice of suppliers or customers, and
to cases where the franchisee is restricted in determining its prices.
Provision is also made for an 'opposition procedure' pursuant to which the exemption may
be extended to agreements containing restrictions of competition which are not expressly
mentioned in the Regulation. Such agreements must be notified to the Commissionwhich then has six months in which to oppose the exemption. An agreement which has
not been opposed within this period is automatically exempted under the Regulation.
The possibility of the withdrawal of the exemption is provided, in particular, in cases
where access to, or competition within, a specific market is substantially restricted.
Industrial property
Industrial property rights include patents, copyrights, trademarks, performing rights
registered designs and models. 'Know-how' is not actually an industrial property right
but it is sometimes treated analogously.
At present, how these rights can be obtained and used is determined by the national laws
of each Member State.
The existence of these national systems is in itself perfectly legitimate, but a problem
arises where the national rules are used to partition the common market along national
boundaries. This is a matter relating to the free movement of goods within the Commu"
nity. A second problem relates to how the owner of an industrial property right uses that
right or allows others to use it. Here, the competition rules may be relevant. Both of these
problems have taken on an added significance in the light of the single market strategy.
The following general rules are important to bear in mind when dealing with industrial
property rights:
(i) The principle of the free movement of goods. Once goods protected by industrial pro-
perty rights have been legitimately marketed in Member State A, by the owner or
someone authorized by him to do so (for example, a licensee), the importation ofthose
goods into Member State B cannot be prevented on the basis of the parallel property
rights existing under the national legislation of Member State B. For example, a
manufacturer registers a trademark for his products in each Member State where the
products are sold, for example France and Germany. Once the goods in question have
been marketed in Germany, the importation of those goods into France cannot be
stopped by invoking the same trademark it is registered under in France.
Of course, where a third party unlawfully uses a registered trademark, the manufac-
turer can take the necessary steps, but this is a normal case of trademark infringe-
ment, not a matter of illegally partitioning the common market.
(ii) If an undertaking is in a dominant position in the common market or a substantial
part thereof, the improper exploitation of an industrial property right may be in viola"
tion of Article 86 (abuse of a dominant position). There must, of course, be an actual
or potential effect on trade between Member States.
(iii) The owner of an industrial property right may decide to confer upon an enterprise
the benefit of that right; for example, he may let another firm use his registeredtrademark, or if he is the owner of a patent, he may confer a licence to manufacture
and sell the goods to another. In return, the other party will normally be asked to pay
a royalty. In itself, such authorization of a third party to exploit the patent or any other
industrial property right is not caught by Article 85(1). Problems may, however, arise
when the authorization is accompanied by clauses which restrict competition
without being justified in that they protect the industrial property right.
In general, the tests for application of Article 85(1) or exemption under Article 85(3)
are the same in the area of industrial property rights as in other areas.
Patent licensing (Commission Regulation No 2349/84)
Patent licensing agreements may present problems in view of the territorial restriction
they impose, which can lead to the isolation of national markets, and the exclusivity they
confer on the licensee to manufacture and/or sell the products covered by the patent.
On the other hand, patent licensing has a number of beneficial aspects. Such agreements
allow firms which might otherwise not be in a position to do so, to obtain access to new
technologies. Also, patent licensing encourages the innovative activities of smaller firms
which do not have the financial resources to exploit their inventions themselves
throughout the whole Community.
In recognition of the beneficial effects which patent licensing agreements can have, the
Commission adopted a group exemption in this area, which is characterized by three main
principles:
(i) in the first place .it recognizes the need for a certain degree of protection for the holder
of a patent (licensor) and his licensees. This will create a favourable environment for
the transfer of new technology throughout the Community and at the same time
stimulate and reinforce R&D activities of undertakings, which generate advanced
techniques and new products;
(ii) secondly, it aims to assure effective competition and, subject to certain limitations
the freedom of intra-Community trade for the patented products;
(Hi) thirdly, it provides legal security for the contract partners.
As to the problem of territorial protection for both the licensor and the licensee, the
regulation exempts the grant of exclusivity by the licensor to the licensee and allows each
party to be protected against any competition, active or passive, from the other party
throughout the duration of the agreement.
The licensee may be granted the same full protection against competition from other
licensees for up to five years from the time the product is first put on the market within
the Community. After this initial period, licensees must be free to supply the product in
the territories of other licensees in response to unsolicited demand from customers inthose territories ('passive sales ). A ban on manufacturing or actively selling the product
in other licensees' territories is exempted for the duration of the contract.
The exemption of territorial protection is subject only to the general condition that the
licensed patents or parallel patents are still in force in the protected territory and that the
licensee manufactures the licensed product himself or has it manufactured by a con-
nected undertaking or by a subcontractor.
The Regulation provides a non-exhaustive list of obligations which do not preclude the
exemption, such as obligations on the licensee to obtain from the licensor products
necessary for the exploitation of the invention, to pay a minimum royalty, to keep know-
how communicated to him secret and to restrict his manufacture of the product to one
or more technical fields of application. Such obligations, which are normally not restric-
tive of competition, are also covered in the event that because of the particular economic
or legal circumstances, they do fall within Article 85, even where the licence is non-ex-
clusive.
Also listed are certain clauses which cannot be exempted by the regulation because they
cannot be presumed to have the positive effects requir~d by Article 85(3). These can only
be exempted by individual decision in the light of the specific circumstances of each case.
Such clauses notably include no-challenge clauses, agreements of indefinite duration
non-competition clauses, and quantity and price restrictions.
An opposition procedure identical to the one in the R&D Regulation is included for
agreements which contain restrictions not expressly provided for in the Regulation, as
long as they do not appear on the 'black list'
Know-how licensing
Know-how licensing agreements are now also covered by a block-exemption Regulation
Commission Regulation No 556/89 of 30 November 1988 (OJ L 61, 4.3.1989). This
measure was .enacted in recognition of the increasing economic importance of non-
patented technical information such as descriptions of manufacturing processes, recipes
formulae and drawings. The number of agreements concluded for the exploitation of
such information has increased significantly in recent years. Like patent licences, know-
how agreements are pro-competitive and have beneficial effects upon the economy, in
facilitating the transfer of technology and boosting innovation, but they may, in par-
ticular circumstances, inhibit competition by imposing territorial restrictions. Moreover
given that the transfer of know-how is frequently irreversible, the Commission felt that
it was necessary to provide greater legal certainty for undertakings as regards the com-
patibility of such agreements with the competition rules.The Regulation encompasses pure know-how agreements concluded solely for the ex-
ploitation of such information, as well as mixed know-how and patent licensing
agreements that are not covered by the patent licence block exemption. Know-how, for
this purpose, is defined as a 'body of technical information that is secret, substantial, and
identified in any appropriate form
The structure of the know -how regulation is the same as that of the patent licence Regula-
tion.  Thus, it lists those obligations of a restrictive nature that benefit from automatic
exemption pursuant to Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty, including arrangements involving
territorial protection of the licensor and the licensee against one another in respect of any
exploitation ofthe know-how. This protection is generally available for 10 years from the
date of the first licensing agreement entered into for each relevant territory within the
EC. As between licensees, a la-year and a five-year period of protection, both starting
with the date of the first licensing agreement entered info for a territory within the EC
in respect of the same technology, are permitted respectively against manufacture, use
or active sales and against passive competition.
The Regulation also provides examples of obligations which are not regarded as restric-
tive of competition and whose inclusion in an agreement will not affect the applicability
of the exemption. These include requirements that the licensee does not divulge the
know-how to third parties, grant sub-licences, assign the licence or exploit the know-how
where it remains secret after the termination of the agreement. The obligation to inform
the licensor of any experience gained in exploiting the know-how and to grant him a non-
exclusive licence in respect of improvements to, or new applications of the know-how is
subject to certain conditions, also permissible.
Finally, the Regulation lists provisions which, if contained in a know-how licensing agree-
ment, would preclude the application of the block exemption. These include non-
challenge clauses, agreements providing for automatic prolongation, non-competition
clauses and quantity and price restrictions. Such agreements must be notified to the Com-
mission which will decide whether an individual exemption is justified according to the
particular circumstances of the case.
As in other group exemptions, the know-how Regulation provides for an opposition pro-
cedure allowing the exemption to be extended to agreements containing restrictions
which are not expressly mentioned in the Regulation but which are nevertheless, com-
patible with Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty.IV - Enforcement of the competition rules
Enforcement by the national courts
As was stated in Chapter I, the European Community has, at its disposal, a number of
instruments for applying and implementing Community policy. Community rules, in the
form of regulations and decisions are directly applicable and binding in the Member
States. Regulations are generally applicable, while decisions are binding on those to
whom they are addressed. ueaty provisions and directives are also capable of conferring
rights upon private litigants to the extent that they have direct effect as defined by the
European Court of Justice.In practical terms, it is now established that the Community competition rules create
rights and obligations for private legal parties which may be raised in national legal pro-
ceedings. Accordingly, any company or individual who claims to have suffered injury as
a result of actions which were in breach of Community competition law has access, in
principle to a national remedy, and is entitled to make a claim for damages. However, the
exact legal nature of the claim and the level of damages available will vary according to
local jurisdictional rules and procedures.
To date, undertakings concerned about a possible breach of the competition rules have
tended to use the Community s own complaints procedure (see the following section of
this chapter) in preference to direct action against the alleged offenders in the national
courts. This is despite the fact that the powers of the Commission and the Court of
Justice, while extensive, do not include the award of damages to injured parties.
Where a person or company suffers loss, as a result of such an infringement, it may
therefore, be appropriate to seek relief using available local remedies. In this connection
plaintiffs should be aware of the possibility, available to all national judges, of referring
questions of Community law to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
Courts of final appeal are obliged to seek a preliminary ruling, where a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment.
Enforcement by the Commission
Running parallel to the possibility of such actions before national courts is an elaborate
procedure of application of the competition rules by the Commission. In some ways, this
procedure has further-reaching consequences for the firms involved than actions at na-
tionallevel, in that, for example:
(i) the Commission has the power to impose administrative fines for infringement of the
competition rules;
(ii) the Commission has extensive powers to collect the information it needs in order 
determine whether an infringement is taking place;
(iii) only the Commission has the power to grant exemptions on the basis of Article 85(3);
(iv) the Commission can take interim measures to bring damaging behaviour to an im-
mediate halt.
The procedure before the Commission cannot, however, culminate in an award of
damages to the victim. Fines imposed are paid to the Commission, not to the injured
party.The initiation of a procedure
There are a number of ways in which a procedure before the Commission involving the
competition rules can be set in motion:
(a) notification, for negative clearance or for exemption;
(b) complaints;
(c) own-initiative action by the Commission;
(d) sector investigations by the Commission.
Notification
The mechanism of notification
Agreements between enterprises and decisions by associations (e.g. trade associations)
may be submitted to the Commissiontoseeka decision from the latter that the agreement
does not violate Article 85(1) at all (this is a negative clearance) or that the agreement
does fall under Article 85(1) but meets the conditions for exemption under Article 85(3).
Although the correct terminology is 'application for negative clearance' and ' notification
for exemption, the term 'notification' is used for both possibilities. In fact, applicants will
normally submit one notification to the Commission seeking negative clearance or, in
the alternative, individual exemption.
Note:  No notification is necessary when an agreement falls under .one of the group ex-
emptions.
Notification must be made in writing on an official form issued by the Commission (Form
A/B). This form requires the applicant(s) to give detailed information relating to the par-
ties to the agreement and the essential features and aims of the agreement. To avoid any
possible misunderstanding, it is wise to attach a copy of the agreement in its entirety to
the form.
Notification need not be made by all those concluding an agreement, but whoever takes
it upon himself to notify must in any event be a party to the agreement. Officially
authorized representatives are also permitted to submit a notification.
Finally, enterprises should be aware of the importance of submitting accurate, complete
and truthful information in their notifications. The Commission has the power to impose
fines of up to ECU 5 000 where applicants intentionally or through negligence supply
incorrect or misleading information in a notification.Copies of Form AJB and the accompanying explanatory memorandum prepared by the
Commission can be obtained from the Commission s Information Offices in each
Member State and also outside the Community (a list of these adresses is given at the
end of this brochure).
The importance of notification
There are three main reasons why notification can be very important to firms:
(i) as a rule the Commission cannot grant negative clearance or an individual e:xemption
with regard to any agreement which has not been notified to it in the proper manner;
(ii) no administrative fines can be imposed by the Commission for activities which take
place after notification and until the Commission reaches a decision, final or provi~
sional, as to the applicability of Article 85(1) andbr Article 85(3), provided those ac-
tivities do not go beyond those described in the notification;
(iii) where the Commission has established an opposition procedure for 'borderline' cases
the operation of this procedure requires notification of the agreement.
The fines which can be imposed for actual violation of Articles 85(1) and 86 must be
distinguished from the (more minor) fines which can be imposed where a notification in-
tentionally or negligently contains misleading or untruthful information.
There are two exceptions to the general rule that, to obtain an exemption under Article
85(3), the agreement in question must be notified to the Commission:
(1) agreements which fall under one of the group exemptions are automatically exempted
(subject to notification, to qualify under the opposition procedure);
(2) certain types of agreement do not have to be notified, and can nevertheless, if the case
arises, be exempted by the Commission retrospectively to the date on which the agree-
ment was concluded.  In  broad lines, the requirement to notify does not apply to:
(a) agreements between parties located only in one Member State and not relating
to imports or exports, in other words, agreements which are purely domestic or
local in scope;
(b) agreements between two parties in which the sole restriction is a unilateral restric-
tion on one of the parties as to prices and terms of resale or as to the exercise of
industrial property rights or know-how;
(c) agreements between two parties which have as their sole object:
the development or uniform application of certain standards or types, or
joint research and development, or
specialization in manufacturing, where the market share is not more than 20%
and aggregate annual turnover not more than ECD 500 million.A caveat should be added:
(i) in case any doubt exists as to whether a particular agreement falls under one of the
categories for which notification is not required, the parties should not hesitate to
notify;
(ii) the advice 'when in doubt, do notify' is especially important because the benefit of
immunity from fines is available only with respect to notified agreements and
agreements covered by group exemptions.
Quick checklist in connection with notification
When deciding whether or not an agreement should be notified to the Commission
undertakings should run through the following questions:
(i) Does the agreement have any connection at all with competition? If not  for exam-
ple, if the agreement concerns a simple sale of goods  there is no need to con-
template notification.
(ii) If the agreement does feature certain restrictions on competition, are the competition
rules nevertheless inapplicable because, for example, the effects are minimal, or the
activity is covered by one of the relevant Commission notices? If so, parties need not
notify.
(iii) If the agreement seems likely to contain elements which are contrary to Article 85(1),
but also appears to thy parties to fulfil the requirements for exemption under Article
85(3), parties must determine:
(a) whether the agreement falls under one of the group exemptions.
If so there is no need to notify. The agreement is safe and no fines can subsequently
be imposed;
(b) whether the agreement is one of the types of agreement for which notification is
not required. Ifso there is no need to notify. Exemption can if necessary be obtain-
ed later, even in the absence of notification. One risk in not notifying is, however
that immunity from fines is not guaranteed.
If neither of the above applies, parties should make the proper notification on Form
A/B as soon as possible after concluding the agreement (or even before). The impor-
tance of timely notification lies in the fact that fines may still be imposed for the period
preceding notification.
Complaints
General
Anti-competitive behaviour can be brought to the attention of the Commission by way
of a complaint.Potential complainants should first carefully consider a number of questions:
(i) Is the object of the complaint autonomous behaviour by undertakings, or is the
behaviour imposed by national legislation? In the latter case, the competition rules
do not apply.
(ii) Is there a transfrontier effect involved in the behaviour? If not, the matter would be
one of national, not Community, competence.
(iii) Are all the other elements of either Article 85 or 86 fulfilled? For actions under Article
, the complainant should check whether the agreement in question is perhaps 
minimis.  In thatcase, there is no point in complaining. For Article 86 cases, a domi-
nant position is required - not always an easy requirement to prove ~ and there must
be an abuse thereof.
(iv) Would action before a national court be preferable in order to obtain damages?
In short to avoid wasting the time of all involved, complaints should only be submitted
after careful consideration.
Who can complain?
Those entitled to submit complaints are Member State authorities, individuals or legal
persons, such as companies or trade associations.
One essential requirement is that a complainant must have a legitimate interest in the
termination of the objectionable behaviour. Parties to an agreement would in any event
be deemed to have a legitimate interest. Furthermore, any third party who can show that
the alleged anti-competitive behaviour is damaging - even potentially ~ to him, will
normally have a legitimate interest.
Conseqnences
When a complaint is submitted by a party having a legitimate interest in the matter, the
Commission will examine whether a violation of the competition rules is in fact taking
place. If the complaint turns out to be well-founded, the Commission can then take the
necessary measures to put an end to the infringement. If, on the other hand, the Commis-
sion, after examining the matter, finds that the complaint is not justified, it must inform
the complainant of its reasons for not pursuing the matter. The complainant must then
be allowed a certain period of time to submit any further comments, after which the Com"
mission will either continue its investigation, if new facts have come to light, or definitely
reject the complaint.Form and contents ofa complaint
There are no specific requirements as to the form in which a complaint is made. However
given the fact that the Commission is only obliged to investigate a complaint by.a party
showing a legitimate interest in the m,atter, it is in the interest of the complainant clearly
to present the facts involved in writing. A simple letter is sufficient. The complaint should
in any event include:
(a) the name and address of the complainant;
(b) the identity of the undertaking(s) which are the subject of the complaint;
(c) evidence which support the complainant's claim to a legitimate interest in the matter;
(d) a clear description of the substance of the complaint and, if possible, the reasons why
the complainant believes the behaviour in question constitutes an infringement of
Article 85 ancLbr 86;
(e) if the complaint is signed by a representative, evidence of his authority to act on behalf
of the complainant.
The party who is the subject of the complaint will be informed of the complaint against
him and will be given the opportunity to present his views. In this context, the complai-
nant would be well advised to indicate clearly which parts of his complaint are to be con-
sidered as confidential and thus not to be transmitted to the party in question.
Informal or anonymous complaints
The Commission also receives oral - sometimes anonymous- complaints. The dif-
ference with the 'formal' complaints described above is that the Commission is  under no
obligation to examine such so-called informal complaints, although it may of course do
so if it wishes.
Therefore, where there is serious evidence that an infringement of the competition rules
is taking place, any undertaking which is being harmed by the behaviour in question
should contemplate the advantage of lodging a formal complaint in writing.
Own-initiative intervention by the Commission
There is a variety of ways in which the Commission can become aware of possibly anti-
competitive behaviour. These include questions raised in the European Parliament
articles in newspapers, information received from Member State authorities, or contacts
with interest groups, such as consumer organizations. Although the Commission is not
obliged to pursue matters which come to its attention in this way, it can decide on its owninitiative to examine further, such cases and will definitely do so if the information it has
received seems to point to a serious infringement of the competition rules.
Furthermore, the Commission has the power to conduct general inquiries into economic
sectors where it feels competition is being restricted or distorted. Such inquiries have, for
example, taken place in the brewery industry and the margarine industry.
Fact-finding by the Commission: procedural decisions
Where the Commission decides that commercial activities which have come to its atten-
tion seem to pose problems in the context of the competition rules, it will normally need
more information to be able to reach a definite opinion on the legality of the behaviour
in question.
There are two basic ways in which the Commission can obtain information from under-
takings:
(i) written requests for information;
(ii) investigations.
Requests for information
The Commission can send written requests (including telexes) for information, not only
to undertakings which are suspected of infringements, but also to third parties who may
be in a position to clarify certain matters. For example, where the Commission is examin-
ing the behaviour of a dominant firm, it may ask smaller firms who have dealings with
that firm to indicate whether they have ever been subject to specific abusive treatment
by it.
Requests for information involve the following consequences:
(i) where the undertakings interrogated reply promptly, correctly and completely to the
Commission & letter, no further complications need be feared (although the Commis-
sion may, of course, subsequently request additional information);
(ii) if in their reply the undertakings concerned provide incorrect or incomplete informa"
tion, the Commission has the right to impose fines of up to ECU 5 000;
(iii) if the undertakings choose to ignore the initial request for information altogether, or
if their reply is incomplete, the Commission may as a second step take a formal deci-
sion ordering complete information to be supplied. Failure to respond to this formal
decision is not to be recommended, because daily default fines of up to ECU 1 000
can be imposed by the Commission until a complete reply is finally received.In sum, undertakings who receive a request for information from the Commission must
seriously bear in mind:
(a) that if they decide to reply, that reply must be correct and complete;
(b) that if they do not reply to the first request for information, they stand the risk of
subsequently being forced to reply anyway, if necessary, by means of daily default
payments.
Investigations
The Commission has the power to send authorized officials to the premises of undertak-
ings in order to gather the information it needs. The officials who make an inspection
visit are entitled to examine the company s business records and documents, take copies
or extracts thereof, request explanations and enter all premises, land or vehicles belonging
to the company. Again, as in the case of written requests for information, undertakings
who submit to such an inspection but produce the requested material in incomplete form
run the risk of fines of up to BCU 5 000.
Undertakings are not obliged to admit Commission officials who come on inspection, but
the Commission may then proceed to take a formal decision ordering them to comply,
if necessary reinforced by a daily penalty payment of up to ECU 1 000 for each day the
undertaking refuses to admit the Commission inspectors.
The Commission is not obliged first to give the undertaking concerned the opportunity
to comply with an investigation based on a simple mandate before passing on to the more
forceful instrument of ordering the undertaking to comply by a formal decision. Norm-
ally, the Commission will resort to an unannounced visit by decision at the outset where
a serious risk exists that the undertakings, if forewarned of the inspection, will destroy
any incriminating evidence.
Undertakings who receive a visit from Commission inspectors are allowed to ask for a
legal adviser to be present, but the inspection can not be unduly delayed to await the
arrival of such a person.
The procedure leading to a final decision
The three basic types of decisions which the Commission can take in application of  Ar-
ticles 85 and 86 are:
(i) decisions granting negative clearance;
(ii) exemption decisions pursuant to Article 85(3);
(iii) decisions ordering the termination of an infringement.The procedural decisions which the Commission can take in connection with its powers
of investigation, for example, ordering an undertaking to admit Commission inspectors
have been dealt with in the preceding paragraph.
Other measures which may occur when the Commission deals with a case are:
(a) interim measures;
(b) provisional decisions;
(c) informal settlements.
Negative clearance
When an undertaking has made an application on Form A/B, seeking formal assurance
from the Commission that its agreement or other commercial activities are not deemed
to infringe the competition rules, the Commission must first give any other interested par.
ties the chance to make their views on the matter known. This is done by publishing the
main facts of the case in the  Official Journal.  Any interested parties are given a specific
period of time to react to this publication and thus new facts may be brought to light
which may cause the Commission to reconsider its position.
A second formality which must be observed before negative clearance can be given is con.
sultation of Member State authorities, who meet for this purpose in the body referred
to as the 'Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions~
If after these steps have been observed the Commission maintains the view that negative
clearance is justified, a formal decision is taken which states that on the basis of the facts
in its possession, there are no grounds for the Commission to take any action under Arti-
cle 85(1) andbr Article 86 against the agreement or other commercial activity involved.
It  is clear that if new facts subsequently arise or if the circumstances involved change
substantially, the Commission retains the power to reconsider the matter. To date,
however, no cases have occurred in which the Commission has gone back on a decision
granting negative clearance.
Exemption
As in the case of negative clearances, a decision granting exemption must be preceded
by publication in the  Official Journal  of the main elements involved, giving interested
parties the opportunity to submit any observations, and by consultation of the Advisory
Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions.The Commissions decision indicates why the agreement or other activity in question is
deemed to violate Article 85(1) and what elements have been found by the Commission
which fulfil all the requirements for justifying an exemption under Article 85(3).
Exemption is always granted for a fixed period of time, which can be extended. The deci-
sion may impose certain obligations on the undertakings involved and in some cases, the
parties may be requested to modify certain aspects of their agreement before exemption
can be granted at all.
Normally, exemption can only be granted as of the date of notification. Only in the case
of certain types of agreement which need not be notified (see above) can exemption be
granted as of the .date on which the agreement was concluded.
Decisions attacking an infringement
Procedure
When a matter comes to its attention through a complaint, a notification or in any other
way, the Commission may reach the preliminary conclusions that a violation of Article
85(1) or 86 is taking place and, in the case of notifications, that the conditions for granting
an exemption under ArtiCle 85(3) are not present.
The Commission must give the parties concerned notice of its objections to their
behaviour in the form of a written communication known as the 'statement of objections:
Annexed to the statement of objections is a list of the documents which constitutes the
Commissions file in a particular case. In order to prepare their response, parties may ex-
amine the file on the Commissions premises, although documents of a confidential
nature, for example, concerning other undertakings' business secrets or internal Commis-
sion notes, are normally not accessible. Parties are given a specific time-limit - normally
one or two months, depending on the complexity of the case - to respond in writing
to the Commissions objections.
After their written response, parties can also request an opportunity to argue their case
orally. This 'oral hearing' is organized by the Directorate-General for Competition and
is conducted by the Hearing Officer. This official ensures that the rights of the defence
are respected and has the right to make observations to ensure that in the procedure
leading to the Commission s decision, due account is taken of all the relevant facts
whether favourable or unfavourable to the parties concerned.
Following the oral hearing, the Commission must consult the Advisory Committee on
Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions.Only after all these procedural steps have taken place can the Commission come to a final
decision.
Contents of the decision
Where an infringement is found to exist, the Commission will order the undertaking in-
volved to put an end to it forthwith, a so-called cease and desist order. Of course, where
the parties have already terminated the infringement, for example, during the course of
the procedure before the Commission, the decision may simply consist of a declaration
that the behaviour in question constituted an infringement.
If appropriate, the Commission also has the power to order positive action by the under-
takings involved. For example, where a dominant undertaking has been found to abuse
its position by refusing to supply a customer, the Commission may require that firm to
resume supplies within a specified period and ensure appropriate supply arrangements
for the future.
Fines
The Commission has the power to impose fines of up to ECU 1 million or 10% of the
world annual turnover. of the undertaking concerned in the previous business year
(whichever of the two is greater), where undertakings are found to have infringed Article
85(1) or 86, intentionally or through negligence.
Whether or not a fine will be imposed, and the determination of the amount of the fine
will depend, among other things, on the seriousness of the behaviour, how long it went
on and the size of the undertakings involved. A deliberate infringement will normally
deserve a heavier fine than where undertakings can only be accused of negligence. Ac-
tivities which have been frequently attacked by the Commission in the past will also war-
rant heavier fines, because such undertakings should realize, through the case-law built
up by the Commission and the Court of Justice, that this behaviour is not permitted.
With respect to notified agreements, fines cannot be imposed for the period between the
moment of notification and the Commissions decision, whether provisional or definite
(see below).
Fines are, however, possible for the period during which the agreement was in force
before notification.
Also, where the Commission refuses to grant an exemption, the result is that the agree-
ment in question, whose illegality is thus conflfmed, may give rise to actions in national
courts, for example, for damages.Interim measures
Depending on the complexity of any given case, it may take the Commission one or two
years or even more to reach a final decision. During that time, the behaviour in question
may give rise to serious and irreparable damage to, for example, a complainant, whose
very existence may be threatened, or it may be totally unacceptable in the general public
interest. In such cases of urgency, the Commission has the power to take immediate action
. in the form of so-called interim measures to stop the objectionable behaviour. Such
measures are of a temporary nature aimed at safeguarding the status quo and do not
determine the final outcome of the matter being dealt with.
Provisional decisions
The general rule is that once an agreement has been notified, no fines can be imposed
with respect to the period after notification. This immunity from fines can, however, be
lost where the Commission takes a provisional decision informing the parties that after
preliminary examination, it is of the opinion that Article 85(1) applies and exemption
under Article 85(3) is not justified.
If the parties disregard this warning, they run the serious risk of being fined in the Com-
missions final decision.
Informal settlements  administrative letters
For the sake of expediency, many cases before the Commission are concluded by way of
an informal settlement, notably where the undertakings involved voluntarily eliminate
any objectionable practices. In fact, the Commission normally takes 20 or so formal deci-
sions each year, whereas the number of informal settlements is usually several hundred.
In some cases, informal settlements take place by way of 'administrative letters' in which
the Commission services inform the parties that it sees no reason to take any action under
the competition rules and that the relevant file will therefore be closed. Such letters are
administrative documents and do not have the legally binding effects of decisions, but
may nevertheless be useful as guidance. Also, the Commissions recently instituted prac-
tice of publishing a notice of its intention to issue an administrative letter in certain cases
allowing third parties to react before it takes any further steps, enhances the value of such
administrative letters.Publicity
Decisions granting negative clearance, exemption or ordering the termination of an
infringement, as well as interim measures and provisional decisions, must be published
in the  Official Journal.  Procedural decisions, such as those formally requesting an under-
taking to supply information, neednot be published in the  Official Journal,  but the Com.
mission may nevertheless decide to do so, for example in cases of general interest.
The Commission normally issues press releases regarding the decisions it has taken. Press
releases can also be used to make the general public aware of informal settlements which
for some reason contain important elements which are of general interest.
Finally, the Commission s monthly  Bulletin as well as the annual  Report on Competition
Policy,  contain information on the decisions and informal settlements that have taken
place.
Control over the Commission by the European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice has the following powers of review over decisions taken
by the Commission:
(i) the Court has the power to confirm, reduce, cancel or increase fines and penalty
payments imposed by Commission decisions;
(ii) all formal decisions by the Commission  negative clearances, decisions granting or
refusing exemption, orders to terminate infringements, decisions requesting informa-
tion, orders to submit to an investigation and provisional decisions relating to theim-
munity from fines - can be reviewed and, if necessary, annulled or varied by the
Court.
Furthermore, appeals can be brought before the Court where the Commission has failed
to act, for example, failure to examine a formal complaint that has been submitted to it
or to inform the complainant of its reasons for not pursuing the matter after preliminary
examination.
Those entitled to bring actions before the Court are all natural or legal persons against
whom a decision has been taken as well as any other parties who are directly and personal-
ly affected by a decision.State aids
Another aspect of Community competition policy that is likely to be of interest to
businesses is the control of national aids. Under Articles 92 .and 93 of the EEC 'Ifeaty
this control is exercised by the Commission.
Article  92,  BEC Treaty
Article 92(1) provides that, as a general rule, all government aid to business is forbidden:
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competitionby favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as
it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market:
The concept of 'aid' is a good deal wider than just government grants, cheap loans and
interest subsidies, where the gratuitous element is immediately obvious. It also covers
such forms of support as tax concessions, public guarantees of corporate borrowing from
banks or the capital market, provision of goods and services on preferential terms, and
in some circumstances, the acquisition of public shareholdings in businesses. Any other
measure having an equivalent effect will also fall within the definition.
Article 92(2) goes on to provide that .certain types of aid are nevertheless compatible with
the common market, namely aid having a social character which is granted to individual
consumers, provided that it is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the
products concerned, aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters, and aid
required to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused to certain areas of the
Federal Republic of Germany by the division of Germany.
Article 92(3) then lists several other categories of aid that may be considered compatible
with the common market:
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is ab-
normally low or where there is serious underemployment;
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest
or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State;
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic
areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent con-
trary to the common interest; and
(d) such other categories of aid as may be specified by a decision of the Council acting
by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.
Article  93,  EEC Treaty
Under Article 93(3), the Member States of the Community are required to notify the
Commission, well in advance, of any plans to introduce new aid schemes or alter existing
ones so that the Commission can determine whether they fall within one or other of the
excepted categories and therefore can be allowed to proceed. The Member State may not
implement the aid scheme until the Commission has taken a final decision.The Commission has two months in which to define its position on a notified scheme.
If it considers the scheme to be compatible with the common market, the Member State
is informed that the scheme may go ahead.
If it does not think it will be able to authorize the scheme, however, it opens a special
procedure, which is laid down in Article 93(2). Under this procedure, the Commission
gives the Member State a certain period, usually a month, in which to defend its scheme
against the objections which the Commission has raised. Comments are also invited from
the other Member States and from other interested parties, the latter being informed by
publication of a notice in the  Official Journal of the European Communities.
At the end of the procedure, the Commission takes a final decision in which it takes into
account the arguments of the Member State concerned and the reactions of the other
Member States and interested parties. It may decide to drop its objections or to order the
Member State to abandon the scheme or to alter it in some way.
In any event, the Commission is obliged to follow the Article 93(2) procedure before turn-
ing down any notified aid scheme.
If the Member State disagrees with the Commissions decision on its aid scheme, it has
two months in which to demand a judicial review by the Court of Justice.
A Member State failing to comply with a decision within the prescribed time, however
can itself be brought before the Court of Justice by the Commission or any other in~
terested Member State.
The Commission has the power to order a Member State to recover from the recipient
any aid it has granted unlawfully, that is to say, without prior notification of the scheme
or before, or in defiance of, the Commissions decision in the case of a scheme that was
notified.
The Commission also has a duty, under Article 93(1), to keep existing aid systems under
constant review and to issue appropriate recommendations to Member States where the
progressive development or functioning of the common market so requires. Existing
schemes include both those in force before the common market was founded and those
introduced later with the Commissions approval. If the Commission finds that, for one
reason or another, such an aid scheme is no longer compatible with the common market
it issues appropriate recommendations either to amend or abolish it. If the Member State
refuses to take the action recommended, the Commission initiates the Article 93(2) pro- .
cedure. In the case of an existing scheme this does not have the same effect of suspending
implementation as it does in the case of a new scheme, that is the Member State can con-
tinue to award aid under the scheme until the Commission has taken a formal decision.VI  Small and medium-sized enterprises
One of the Commissions main concerns in the competition policy area is to strengthen
and preserve small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as an essential element in a
healthy and competitive environment. The Commission remains convinced that such
businesses form one of the basic foundations of the European economy because of the
contribution they make to the competitive structure of the market, their flexibility and
their dynamism.
Articles  85  and  86,  EEG 1J'eaty
An active competition policy makes a significant contribution to creating and maintain-
ing an auspicious environment for SMEs and the competition rules often provide a
valuable weapon in protecting their interests. For example, Article 85 prohibits
agreements through which the parties undertake to apply dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions and to impose on contracting third parties, the requirement that
they accept supplementary conditions which have no connection with the subject of the
contract. The ban on the abuse of dominant positions helps to protect SMEs against
powerful competitors, suppliers or customers. For instance, the Commission has taken
action against the charging of abnormally low prices intended to squeeze out small com-
petitors and against refusals to supply products that are essential to the activity of SMEs.
Competition policy similarly enables the Commission to oppose operations that would
improperly increase a firm s dominant position on the market.
The consistent and effective implementation of the competition rules also presupposes
that SMEs observe such rules themselves. The Commission is aware that this may impose
certain constraints on SMEs, and while an internal Commission study concluded that
the implementation of the competition rules did not impose excessive burdens, it was felt
nevertheless that SMEs should benefit from simplified procedures. This is reflected in the
derogation provided for agreements of minor importance, which are not covered by Arti-
cle 85(1), and which is explained in greater detail in Chapter II.
The desire to limit the constraints on SMEs is also reflected in the various block exemp-
tion regulations which, subject to certain conditions, provide for exemption from the pro-hibition laid down in Article 85(1) (see Chapter III). The following features are of par-
ticular importance to SMEs:
(a) no notification is required, thus avoiding time-consuming procedures;
(b) several block exemption regulations are of direct relevance for SMEs either because
of the conditions for application (market share and turnover criteria) or because of
the nature of the activity concerned, for example:
(i) non-reciprocal exclusive distribution agreements between competitors are only
allowed if at least one of the parties has an annual turnover of less than ECU 100
million;
(ii) the block exemption regulation on exclusive purchasing agreements, which nor-
mally involve SMEs (e.g. public houses and service stations) prevents the pur-
chaser from being excessively bound to the supplierin terms oftime and the range
of products he buys;
(iii) the regulation on motor vehicle distribution agreements ensures that car dealers
who are usually SMEs are not made overly dependent on the supplier and affords
greater freedom as to the dealer s use of spare parts and sales to other authorized
dealers;
(iv) the patent licensing and know-how block exemption regulations both allow small
firms (as licensees) to gain access to new technologies and also encourages the in-
novative activities of small firms, who (as licensors) can thus exploit their inven"
tions throughout the Community via (bigger) licensees. This helps to safeguard
existing jobs and to create new ones;
(v) the block exemption on specialization agreements, which applies only where
market share and turnover thresholds (20% and ECU 500 million) are not ex-
ceeded, was specifically created to allow SMEs to improve their production pro-
cesses and thereby strengthen their competitive position;
(vi) the research and development block exemption regulation provides that com-
peting undertakings which together have a market share of less than 20% may
engage in joint research and development and joint exploitation of the results.
This criterion implies that nearly all agreements of this type involving SMEs will
be covered;
(vii) the franchising block exemptionregulation, which gives franchisors the possibili-
ty of establishing a uniform network with limited investments, will assist the en"
try of new small and medium-sized competitors to the market. Independent
traders will also be able to set up outlets more rapidly, and with a higher chance
of success than if they had to do so without the franchisor s experience and
assistance.State aids
All Member States dispense aid in one form or another to small and medium-sized fIrms.
As a rule, this aid will fall under Article 92(1) of the EEC Treaty.
The Commission, however is conscious of the handicaps faced by smaller firms. Their
legal form and size puts them at a disadvantage in obtaining finance. They may be too
small for long production runs, so their costs of production are high. They may lack the
scientific and technical resources for research and development and, very often, they will
also suffer from handicaps in the field of management, organization and marketing.
The Commission also recognizes the importance to the single market of having a healthy
and substantial network of small and medium-sized firms. These contribute to economic
growth and employment creation as well as performing an essential role in the
maintenance of effective competition and in the balanced social and economic develop-
ment of the regions.
These factors together make it easier for the Commission to condone aid to a small or
medium-sized firm than to a large company, and this is reflected in the application of the
State-aid rules.
Aid authorized by the Commission to the small.business sector
The type of aid Member States choose to extend to small firms will depend on the pro-
blems that have to be solved, which will vary at different stages of a business s life:
whether it is just starting up or is already an established business, being extended or
switching to a new field, or changing hands.
The aid to small and medium-sized firms which the Commission has authorized in the
past under Article 92(3) (c) of the EEC Treaty has often taken one of the following forms:
(i) grants, low-interest loans or loan guarantees to help small businesses get started;
(ii) low-interest loans or loan guarantees for investment by small businesses, which offer
them terms matching those which the largest companies are able to obtain on the
capital market or from banks;
(iii) public support to encourage the flow of risk capital to the small-business sector; the
Commission has, for example, authorized a number of aid schemes involving
specialized public agencies buying temporary stakes in small firms, the extension of
government guarantees for private venture capital companies taking temporary
stakes in such firms, or the grant of subordinated government loans enabling the firm
to obtain further loans on that basis from the banking sector;(iv) grants for research and development. As small fIfIllS do not always have the staff or
facilities to carry out  R&D  themselves, some Member States have introduced, with
the Commissions approval, aid schemes designed to reduce the cost of  R&D  work
contracted out to others. The Commission s framework for aids in the  R&D  field
which was adopted in 1985, establishes criteria which are particularly favourable for
small firms;
(v) grants or low-interest loans to innovation projects undertaken by small or medium-
sized businesses (development of new products or manufacturing processes or radical
improvement of existing products or processes), which might not proceed without
government support because of the high risk they involve  in  both technological and
financing terms;
(vi) grants or low-interest loans to investment projects involving energy or raw material
savings or the replacement of oil by alternative fuels;
(vii) grants towards the cost of improving small firms' management or sales policy with
the help of outside consultants or computerization.
In line with this general approach to small business, the Commission has cleared a
number of proposals for setting up new aid schemes for the small-firm sector or for alter.
ing existing schemes.  In  some cases it has insisted on a lowering of the size limits for
eligibility to ensure that only small or medium-sized firms can benefit under the scheme.Conclusion
A concise overview of the complicated rules which form EEC competition law cannot
pretend to give a ready answer to every imaginable question that may arise in practice.
It is hoped that this brochure will provide undertakings with a sufficiently complete pic-
ture to enable them to recognize situations in which the competition rules may be rele-
vant and to deal, at least in the first instance, with potential conflicts.
Where undertakings are, for whatever reason, not in a position to reach an acceptable
conclusion about the legality of a given matter, expert advice should of course be sought.
In this connection, companies may consult specialist lawyers, national or European trade
associations, federations of industry, chambers of commerce, European Parliamen-
tarians, and, last but not least, the competition services of the European Commission.
It is important for the success of the single market that healthy competition is preserved.
The Communitys competition policies and rules will, therefore, continue to have a cen-
tral role in post-1992 Europe, and it is in the interests of all companies to enhance their
knowledge and awareness of this field.
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